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 Commentators have long tried to sound the alarm about boilerplate contracts, 
pointing out threats ranging from the loss of privacy rights to the erosion of public 
law and democratic self-governance. This Article argues that this list of concerns 
misses something important: that imposing certain boilerplate terms on individuals 
is incompatible with their dignity. After explaining and defending the conception of 
dignity presupposed here, this Article shows how boilerplate accountability 
waivers—like arbitration clauses—prevent people from accessing the distinctive 
dignity-vindicating role of courts and degrade their status as legal persons. And 
because governments may legitimately protect dignity interests, proposed reforms 
like the Arbitration Fairness Act have an even stronger justification than previously 
recognized. Boilerplate indignity should, in any event, force us to take a hard look 
at the dignity interests jeopardized by fine print, interests routinely sacrificed at the 




I.  BOILERPLATE ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS AND THEIR CRITICS.................. 1309 
A.  BOILERPLATE ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS ........................................ 1309 
1.  ARBITRATION CLAUSES ............................................................ 1309 
2.  OTHER ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS ......................................... 1312 
B.  EXISTING CRITICISMS OF BOILERPLATE ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS 1316 
1.  IMPOVERISHED CONSENT .......................................................... 1316 
2.  SYSTEMIC HARMS ..................................................................... 1321 
II.  THE INDIGNITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS .......................................... 1323 
A.  THE CONCEPT AND VALUE OF DIGNITY ............................................. 1325 
1.  THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY ........................................................ 1325 
2.  THE VALUE OF DIGNITY............................................................ 1329 
B.  HOW ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS JEOPARDIZE DIGNITY ................... 1332 
1.  THE INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENT: HOW COURTS VINDICATE 
DIGNITY .................................................................................... 1333 
2.  THE ARGUMENT FROM FORM: AGAINST LEVELING DOWN ....... 1336 
C.  OBJECTIONS ........................................................................................ 1339 
1.  CONSENT REVISITED ................................................................. 1339 
2.  TRADEOFF ARGUMENTS ............................................................ 1342 
3.  PROVING TOO MUCH ................................................................ 1346 
III.  APPLICATIONS: EX ANTE AND EX POST ........................................................ 1347 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *. Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Texas at Austin School of Law. The 
author would like to thank Oren Bar-Gill, Rachel Bayefsky, Steve Bero, Maggie Blackhawk, 
Barbara Fried, Jonathan Glater, John Goldberg, Mark Greenberg, Tim Holbrook, Greg 
Keating, Christopher Lewis, Andrei Marmor, Julian Nyarko, Russell Robinson, Alex Sarch, 
Matthew Seligman, Seana Shiffrin, Aaron Tang, and Franita Tolson for comments and 
conversations about a predecessor to this Article. The author owes a special debt of gratitude 
to Aziza Ahmed and Guy-Uriel Charles. This Article was completed with support from the 
UCLA Law and Philosophy Program. 
1306 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1305 
 
A.  EX ANTE REGULATION ....................................................................... 1347 
B.  EX POST ADJUDICATION OR INVESTIGATION ...................................... 1349 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 1350 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, consumers tried to form a class to sue 
AT&T for fraudulently charging taxes on cell phones advertised as “free.”1 But there 
was a problem. An arbitration clause was buried in the fine print of their service 
agreements.2 The clause purported to prevent the consumers from forming a class, 
requiring them instead to march single file to arbitration rather than litigate in court.3 
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that the clause was enforceable despite 
lower court decisions finding it unconscionable under California law.4 The Supreme 
Court reasoned that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) both required enforcing the 
arbitration clause and preempted California doctrine.5 Later Supreme Court decisions 
have made challenging arbitration clauses even harder.6  
Arbitration clauses are just one of a number of ways that firms use boilerplate to 
prevent individuals from holding them accountable in courts of law.7 A growing 
chorus has criticized this development. Some critics focus on the legal merits, 
arguing (for example) that the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence unjustifiably 
departs from the text, history, and purpose of the FAA itself.8 Others show how 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 336. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 346–47, 352. 
 6. See Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 7. See infra Section I.B. 
 8. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Justice Scalia and Class Actions: A Loving Critique, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1977, 1984–89 (2017) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s majority opinions 
in Concepcion and Italian Colors as difficult to reconcile with the text, history, or purpose of 
the FAA); Margaret L. Moses, How the Supreme Court’s Misconstruction of the FAA Has 
Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (“Neither the drafters of the 
Federal Arbitration Act nor the Congress that adopted it intended it to cover consumers or 
workers, or to displace state jurisdiction or state substantive law.”); Margaret L. Moses, 
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never 
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 114–22 (2006). 
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boilerplate threatens worker rights and consumer protections,9 contract law,10 
democratic self-governance and participation,11 and even the rule of law itself.12  
This Article takes aim at a different, overlooked, and deeply troubling aspect of 
boilerplate: to the extent that boilerplate clauses attempt to strip individuals of their 
rights to hold firms accountable in courts of law, they thereby threaten dignity. This 
Article refers to these clauses as “accountability waivers.” 
Because my arguments target certain boilerplate practices and their enforcement 
by the state, Part I begins by identifying those practices more precisely. Part I 
describes accountability waivers and identifies common examples, including: 
arbitration clauses (which waive the right to public trial), waivers of rights to litigate 
in class actions, choice-of-forum clauses, and certain wholesale liability disclaimers. 
In order to situate my claims about dignity within broader debates about these 
boilerplate terms, Part I also catalogues some of the existing objections to boilerplate 
waivers of important rights, grouping them roughly into two camps: complaints 
about individual consent and objections rooted in systemic concerns or “negative 
externalities.” Although objections from both camps have some merit, they each miss 
something important about the morally problematic nature of accountability waivers. 
Focusing on systemic harms obscures the mistreatment of individuals. And although 
focusing on the problematic nature of consent in the context of boilerplate rightly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE 
L.J. 3052, 3057 (2015) (claiming that Italian Colors in effect “authorized private parties to 
use mandatory private arbitration clauses to construct procedural rules that have the 
foreseeable, indeed possibly intended, consequence of preventing certain claims from being 
asserted at all, rendering those claims mere nullities”); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. 
Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 807 (2009) (“Privatizing the 
enforcement of statutory rights erodes those rights, as rights that are not enforced publicly 
vanish from the public’s eye, making the public less educated about the laws governing society 
and probably less likely to recognize and correct the laws’ violations.”); Katherine V.W. Stone 
& Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic, (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper No. 414, 
2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WEY-
VYGS].  
 10. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2013) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Of 
Priors and Disconnects, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 259, 260 (2014) [hereinafter, Radin, Of Priors 
and Disconnects] (arguing that her Boilerplate book is in part about a “disconnect . . . between 
theory and practice when we attempt to apply contract theory to the phenomenon of mass-
market boilerplate”).  
 11. ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 84–111 (2017); W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
529 (1971); see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943) (worrying that powerful enterprises 
make contracts of adhesion “effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and 
commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making upon 
a vast host of vassals”). 
 12. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, in PRIVATE LAW AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 292 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014) [hereinafter Radin, 
Boilerplate: A Threat] (arguing that “the rule of law at its most basic level requires that some 
rights not be privatized such that they can be curtailed and sometimes eradicated by firms”). 
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focuses on how firms interact with individuals, consent is far from the only concern 
about the way that firms treat individuals at the transactional level. 
Part II introduces the missing objection, which is that boilerplate accountability 
waivers are incompatible with individual dignity. This claim presupposes a 
conception of “dignity” that Part II makes explicit. The core argument singles out 
two ways in which these waivers undermine dignity, where “dignity” is understood 
as a high-ranking status held by each adult within a political community.13 First, 
courts play a unique role in vindicating a person’s status, given that courts can 
publicly lend their prestige and power to individuals when that status is threatened. 
Second, dignity involves a high-ranking status, one that is determined partly by 
reference to the rights and responsibilities traditionally reserved for the highest-
ranking members of society. Modern dignity “levels up” this aristocratic notion of 
dignity, allocating where possible this set of rights and responsibilities to each person 
in a political community. The right to sue in court is one of these rights. But firms 
that use boilerplate accountability waivers attempt to “level down” in a way 
incompatible with modern dignity. For these reasons, boilerplate accountability 
waivers threaten dignity. 
Part II concludes by responding to the objections that (1) individuals consent to 
this “mistreatment”; (2) individuals actually benefit by trading off their access to 
courts in exchange for cheaper goods or services; and (3) the argument “proves too 
much” by construing perfectly innocent commercial behavior as nefarious. To 
preview my replies, first, consent does not justify all conduct that harms dignity. Nor 
does consent to an item off a menu justify imposing the menu itself; the dignity-
based argument here criticizes the options presented to those subjected to offending 
boilerplate provisions. Second, tradeoff arguments prove too much by implying that 
we should be permitted to wholly waive our rights to hold others accountable in any 
forum whatsoever provided that we might obtain lower prices for goods and services 
as a result. There is also reason to believe that tradeoff arguments are paternalistic. 
Nor does this Article’s argument, third, “prove too much” since not all boilerplate 
terms jeopardize dignity in the way that accountability waivers do. 
Part III turns to the practical implications of the analysis, arguing that taking 
dignity seriously justifies robust attempts to regulate arbitration clauses ex ante and 
should motivate greater efforts to conduct ex post investigation of other 
accountability waivers besides arbitration clauses.  
In the end, not all boilerplate terms threaten dignity. But accountability waivers 
differ. They reflect attempts to wrest control from individuals’ legal power to stand 
up for themselves and vindicate their standing by holding others legally accountable. 
These powers are partially constitutive of one’s status as a full adult person with 
dignity. Firms that arrogate these powers diminish that status. And because 
governments have legitimate interests in protecting dignity, proposed reforms like 
the Arbitration Fairness Act have an even stronger justification than previously 
recognized.14 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. This influential conception is articulated and defended in Jeremy Waldron’s recent 
work. See infra Section II.A. 
 14. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
2019] BOILERPLATE INDIGNITY  1309 
 
I. BOILERPLATE ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS AND THEIR CRITICS 
A. Boilerplate Accountability Waivers 
Boilerplate contracts are ubiquitous.15 Firms draft them, they contain non-
negotiable language purporting to express legally binding terms, they govern the 
relationship between the firm and the signer, and most signers are consumers or 
employees who lack the bargaining power to change the terms.16 Examples include 
leases,17 warranties,18 gym membership agreements,19 cellular phone terms of 
service,20 and employment contracts.21 
Boilerplate contains terms that often systematically favor the drafting party by 
deleting or undermining important legal rights.22 And it is no accident that the rights 
that disappear tend to favor the firm’s bottom line often at the expense of the 
consumer or employee. Even defenders of boilerplate admit, “boilerplates are far 
more firm-friendly than the background default rules that they replace.”23  
The particular boilerplate terms that this Article focuses on, “accountability 
waivers,” are inserted into boilerplate agreements by firms with the aim of preventing 
individuals from retaining or exercising their legal powers to hold those same firms 
legally accountable in courts of law. The main type of accountability waiver is an 
arbitration clause, but there are other types as well. 
1. Arbitration Clauses 
Consumers and employees routinely find themselves subject to boilerplate clauses 
that commit them to private, binding arbitration for any disputes arising in 
connection with their relationship with the firms producing that boilerplate.24 One 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2014) (“Disclosures, fine print, standard terms—these are 
unavoidable facts of modern life.”). 
 16. For a similar definition of a “contract of adhesion,” see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983). Other salient 
features of boilerplate include the fact that the drafter of the agreement engages in many more 
transactions of the particular kind of transaction than the typical signatory. Id. 
 17. See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. L. ANALYSIS 1 (2017). 
 18. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in 
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
49 (2009). 
 21. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 18. 
 22. See generally RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10. 
 23. Omri Ben-Shahar, Book Note, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 883, 893 (2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)). 
 24. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 669 (2001); Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. 
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concern is that arbitrators favor repeat purchasers of arbitration services—i.e., the 
very firms who impose boilerplate on consumers and employees.25 The National 
Arbitration Forum, for example, a firm hired by credit card issuer First USA to 
handle its arbitrations, decided 99.6% of consumer arbitrations in favor of First 
USA.26 Now, courts are not perfect. But to the extent that they lack the same 
incentives to systematically favor firms that repeatedly purchase arbitration services, 
courts of law appear impartial compared to arbitration.27 Whether individuals fare 
better in arbitration than in court remains hotly contested,28 largely because evidence 
about the impartiality of arbitration is limited given that proceedings are often not 
publicly available.29  
Making matters worse, arbitration clauses usually limit the right to form classes, 
even in arbitration.30 Because consumers or employees are forced to pursue their 
                                                                                                                 
 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration 
-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/8P9J-ZYDW]. 
 25. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 215 (1997). For a state-of-the-art discussion of the empirical 
literature on repeat players, accompanied by more nuanced empirical support for the claim 
that extreme repeat players hold advantages in arbitration, though declining to attribute this 
advantage to bias, see David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 83–87, 120–24 (2017) 
(“Concepcion might have created a structural bias that favors extreme repeat players over one-
shotters.”). 
 26. See BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 130–31 (2012) 
(collecting sources and commentary on the National Arbitration Forum). 
 27. The comparative claim is admittedly speculative, but many have voiced serious 
worries about partiality and bias in arbitration, as well as the function of arbitration clauses in 
silencing legal claims rather than diverting them to arbitration. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2014) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Victor 
D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitration 
Clauses Are Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time of Vanishing 
Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2120 (2017) (presenting evidence that “that the more the 
public learns about predispute binding arbitration clauses, the more they believe this dispute-
resolution procedure is unjust and illegitimate”); see also id. at 2138 (“[I]t is highly unlikely 
that those who zealously draft and design adhesion contracts will consider the public’s 
perspective or enact dispute resolution procedures that truly lead to neutral, unbiased, and just 
outcomes.”). 
 28. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011); Horton & Chandrasekhar, 
supra note 25, at 83–87, 120–24; Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang 
Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1 (2015). But see Alan 
Kaplinsky, Mark Levin & Daniel McKenna, Consumers Fare Better with Arbitration, AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion 
/consumers-fare-better-with-arbitration [https://perma.cc/CN45-9GTH].  
 29. See generally Bingham, supra note 25, at 218; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 
27.  
 30. For example, the arbitration clause at issue in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion not 
only mandated arbitration for any dispute arising between contracting parties, it also required 
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claims in arbitration on a case-by-case basis, this terminates in effect their rights to 
form classes.31 Small-dollar claims cannot be aggregated to create incentives for 
plaintiff-side attorneys to represent them, even in arbitration.32 Forcing individuals 
to pursue their small-dollar claims individually therefore defeats one of the purposes 
of class actions. So in effect many arbitration clauses not only divest individuals of 
their right to hold others accountable in public jury trials, they also operate in effect 
to divest individuals of their right to hold others accountable in any ostensibly neutral 
adjudicative setting.33 
At one point, state law doctrines like unconscionability provided a bulwark 
against aggressive arbitration clauses and class-action waivers. Although section 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates that arbitration agreements shall be 
enforceable, the statute’s text contains language that presumably preserves a state’s 
prerogative—grounded in “law” or “equity”—to refuse to enforce some arbitration 
agreements.34 California courts, for example, have held that many arbitration clauses 
are unconscionable and hence unenforceable.35 But the United States Supreme Court 
has chipped away at this prerogative in recent years. In 2008, the Supreme Court held 
that the FAA preempts state laws that prevent arbitration of particular “types” of 
claims.36 The Court went further in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that 
clauses prohibiting class actions even in the context of arbitration were enforceable 
because the FAA preempted California’s so-called Discover Bank rule, under which 
most of those clauses were unconscionable.37  
Formally at least, the Supreme Court has tried to articulate limiting principles on 
the enforcement of arbitration clauses, insisting that they will be enforced only so 
long as they are consistent with the “effective vindication” of federal statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 
that parties seeking to pursue claims do so in their “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff 
or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 336 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (observing that boilerplate provisions that operate to “rais[e] a plaintiff’s costs 
could foreclose consideration of federal claims,” and opining that doing so “run[s] afoul of the 
effective-vindication rule” that is supposed to make sure that arbitration remains a viable 
alternative to litigation).  
 32. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 767, 780 (2012). 
 33. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Cynthia Estlund, The 
Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 679, 703 (2018) (“If the imposition of 
mandatory arbitration means that the employer faces only a miniscule chance of ever 
confronting a formal legal claim in any forum regarding future legal misconduct against its 
employees, then such a provision virtually amounts to an ex ante exculpatory clause, and an 
ex ante waiver of substantive rights that the law declares non-waivable.”). 
 34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 35. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). California courts 
applying the Discover Bank analysis include Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 
1451–53 (2006); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1297 (2005); Aral 
v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 556–57 (2005). 
 36. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008). 
 37. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 341 (2011); see also Discover 
Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
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rights.38 But the Court has chipped away at this exception as well, most notably in its 
recent decision in American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant, which 
holds that arbitration clauses that require class-action waivers must be enforced, even 
when doing so would make it prohibitively expensive to arbitrate federal antitrust 
claims.39 Italian Colors has prompted some scholars to portend the end of class 
action litigation.40 So federal protections against the erosion of individuals’ rights to 
litigate in public courts are slim indeed.  
Critics have argued that the Supreme Court has misapplied the FAA.41 Whatever 
the merits of these criticisms, Concepcion and Italian Colors have undermined 
further the ability of consumers and employees to hold firms accountable in courts 
of law, and have hampered their ability to hold firms accountable in even private 
arbitration.42 Indeed, as a result of these criticisms and its own independent 
investigation into arbitration clauses, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had 
issued a rule barring arbitration clauses across a range of consumer contracts unless 
they permitted consumers to form classes—that is, until Congress used the 
Congressional Review Act to overturn the rule.43 So as it stands, arbitration clauses 
and class waivers still undermine the power that consumers and employees have to 
hold firms legally accountable for claims arising between them and firms. 
2. Other Accountability Waivers  
On their face, arbitration clauses aim to prevent potential plaintiffs from accessing 
courts. But they are not the only form of accountability waiver, since firms 
sometimes use other common boilerplate terms to achieve the same aim. Some 
examples include: hold-harmless clauses, forum-selection clauses, and unilateral 
modification clauses. 
“Hold-harmless” clauses purport to waive rights to sue the drafting firm in 
connection with the underlying contractual exchange.44 Whether courts will enforce 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. at 2304. 
 40. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 8, at 1984–89. Others started sounding the alarm 
much earlier. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near- Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005). 
 41. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 8, at 1984–89. 
 42. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 27, at 2808 (concluding that “few who are cut 
off from using the courts and required (rather than choosing) to arbitrate do so, thereby erasing 
as well as diffusing disputes”); see also id. at 2809 n.15 (observing that “Justice Scalia has 
authored two opinions requiring single-file arbitrations despite evidence that absent the 
capacity to use collective action, claims will not be brought”). 
 43. Renae Merle & Tory Newmyer, Congressional Republicans Use Special Maneuver 




 44. See Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to Bring a 
Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 379 (2014). For more on exculpatory clauses, 
see Anita Cava & Don Wiesner, Rationalizing a Decade of Judicial Responses to Exculpatory 
Clauses, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 611, 640 (1988). 
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these clauses depends in part on how broad they are.45 Courts decline to enforce 
exculpatory clauses that purport to waive rights to sue for intentional harms or harms 
arising from reckless or grossly negligent conduct, sometimes holding that these 
blanket liability waivers violate public policy.46 But some courts enforce negligence 
waivers.47 
Some evidence suggests, however, that firms insert overbroad exculpatory clauses 
into boilerplate despite knowing that they probably would not be enforced.48 There 
is little cost to the firm to draft overbroad provisions, after all, and much to be gained 
in terms of deterring would-be plaintiffs.49 Indeed, other evidence suggests that 
consumers subject to these overbroad clauses are unwilling or unable to test them in 
courts.50 Functionally, then, some boilerplate clauses have the same effect of 
“waiving” rights to sue even when those waivers would not survive a challenge in 
court. To the extent that firms draft exculpatory clauses intending to prevent 
individuals from pursuing claims against them in court, these clauses count as 
accountability waivers. 
Firms also sometimes use forum-selection clauses to keep plaintiffs out of court. 
Unlike arbitration clauses, which on their face attempt to redirect potential plaintiffs 
away from court, forum-selection clauses formally preserve litigants’ access to 
courts.51 Facebook’s Terms of Service, for example, require disputes to be resolved 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or state courts in San 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 138. 
 46. Id.; see also 15-85 Corbin on Contracts § 85.18 (2008) (“Courts do not enforce 
agreements to exempt parties from tort liability if the liability results from that party’s own 
gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional conduct.”).  
 47. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 139 (citing Newton’s Crest Homeowners’ 
Ass’n v. Camp, 702 S.E. 2d. 41, 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) and N. Sunrooms & Additions, LLC 
v. Dorstad, No. A10-1217, 2011 WL 292160, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011)). 
 48. See Furth-Matzkin, supra note 17. 
 49. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 13 (remarking that even if firms were not 
confident about whether a given term were enforceable, “it might reason that the attempt was 
worth trying” given that it might deter lawsuits). For empirical findings consistent with this 
assessment, see generally Furth-Matzkin, supra note 17. 
 50. See e.g., Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract 
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ 
Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83 (1997). 
 51. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) (holding that 
the forum-selection clause expressly preserves rather than nullifies the respondent’s “right to 
‘a trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction’” and thus did not violate a federal statute 
prohibiting such nullifications). 
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Mateo County, California.52 And these clauses are often enforceable.53 Facebook’s 
forum-selection clause in particular has been enforced by some courts.54 
But not all.55 This is at least partly because of the long-recognized “deterrent 
effects” of forum-selection clauses on would-be plaintiffs, “rang[ing] from added 
costs, logistical impediments and delays, to deterrent psychological effects.”56 These 
clauses therefore often make it difficult to sue firms that insert them into 
boilerplate.57 To the extent that forum-selection clauses aim to divest would-be 
consumers and employees of their power to hold firms legally accountable by making 
their claims extremely costly to pursue, these clauses count as a form of 
accountability waiver.58 But to the extent that these clauses are imposed without 
aiming to prevent litigants from having their day in court, they do not count as 
accountability waivers. 
Unilateral modification clauses also enable firms to sidestep legal 
accountability.59 These clauses represent the paradigm of a one-sided term, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Terms of Service § 4.4, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
[https://perma.cc/3CXU-EE7S] (last updated Apr. 19, 2018) (“For any claim, cause of action, 
or dispute you have against us that arises out of or relates to these Terms or the Facebook 
Products (“claim”), you agree that it will be resolved exclusively in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California or a state court located in San Mateo County. You also 
agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of either of these courts for the purpose of litigating 
any such claim, and that the laws of the State of California will govern these Terms and any 
claim, without regard to conflict of law provisions.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 721–22 (2d Cir. 
1982) (observing that “contractual forum-selection clauses will be enforced unless it clearly 
can be shown that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was 
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching”). On the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
willingness to enforce forum-selection clauses, see Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection 
Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional 
Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 57 (1992). 
 54. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting a motion to 
transfer venue to the Northern District of California on the grounds that plaintiffs assented to 
a forum-selection clause in Facebook’s Terms of Service). 
 55. Douez v. Facebook, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (Can.) (declining to enforce Facebook’s 
forum-selection clause). 
 56. Id. (Abella, J., concurring) (citing Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation 
Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 
423, 514 (1992)); see also Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. 
Va. 1986) (holding that “a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is 
told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection 
clause, where there is a material difference in bargaining power, and where the forum 
designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for 
the parties and witnesses”) (emphasis added). 
 57. See Yoder, 630 F. Supp. at 759. 
 58. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 331, 401 (“[F]orum selection clauses in contracts of adhesion are sometimes a 
method for stripping people of their rights.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 59. Judith Resnik provides the following example from an AT&T consumer contract: 
“We may change any terms, conditions, rates, fees, expenses, or charges regarding your 
Services at any time.” Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 27, at 2806 (quoting Wireless 
2019] BOILERPLATE INDIGNITY  1315 
 
permitting the drafter to change other terms of the agreement but denying the same 
privilege to the consumer or employee subject to those agreements. It is not clear the 
extent to which unilateral modification clauses are enforced.60 But they are common. 
They appear in credit card agreements,61 consumer loyalty programs,62 subscription 
services,63 and so on.64 Modification clauses allow firms to evade liability by 
changing terms on the fly, allowing firms to change the terms of the relationship that 
holds between them and consumers, and hindering legal accountability (given that 
firms’ accountability for breach of contract is a function of the terms of the 
underlying contract itself).65 By claiming the sole power to change terms, firms make 
it more difficult to hold them accountable. So to the extent that unilateral 





The accountability waivers listed above do not exhaust the field.66 But the 
arguments that follow will often focus on arbitration clauses, primarily because they 
unambiguously count as accountability waivers. After all, by inserting arbitration 
clauses into their boilerplate, firms make no secret of their aims: to prevent 
individuals from exercising their legal powers to hold those firms accountable in 
courts of law. That is, after all, precisely what arbitration clauses are designed to do: 
eliminate the need for courts. By contrast, it is less obvious (for example) that a 
forum-selection clause aims to deprive individuals of their day in court, given that 
these clauses formally and ostensibly preserve access to courts. This makes it more 
difficult to distinguish forum-section clauses that count as genuine accountability 
waivers (i.e., those that aim to prevent individuals from having or exercising rights 
                                                                                                                 
 
Customer Agreement, AT&T § 1.3 (2015), http://www.att.com/legal/terms 
.wirelessCustomerAgreement-list.html [http://perma.cc/ 9XA6-E956]); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP 
CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 65 (2013) (“Modification at will, or unilateral 
modification clauses, typically state that the website can modify the agreement at any time, 
and the consumer assents by using the site after such modification.”). For further examples, 
see KIM, supra, at 66. 
 60. See KIM, supra note 59, at 67 (observing a court “split”); Michael L. DeMichele & 
Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification Provisions in Employment Arbitration Agreements, 
24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63, 64–65 (2006). 
 61. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 649 (2010). 
 62. See Carmen Labbozzetta, A Principled Approach to Reward Loyalty: An Argument 
for Code of Conduct Principles to Remedy the Contractual Unfairness and Legislative 
Confusion in Loyalty Programs, 4 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 123, 125 (2007). 
 63. See Horton, supra note 61, at 628. 
 64. See id.  
 65. See id.  
 66. Another potential form of accountability waiver, for example, includes limitations on 
remedies that aim to prevent access to courts. See RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 140– 
42; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private 
Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407 (2016) (arguing against the growing enforceability of contract 
clauses that stipulate the remedy for breaching other clauses in the same contract). 
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to sue those firms), as opposed to those forum-selection clauses that genuinely seek 
to preserve court access. In any event, although much of the following discussion 
focuses primarily on arbitration clauses, they represent just one of broad family of 
accountability waivers. 
B. Existing Criticisms of Boilerplate Accountability Waivers 
Criticisms of boilerplate accountability waivers can be roughly characterized in 
terms of whether they focus on how individuals are wronged or the systemic harms 
associated with the waivers of rights. In what follows, I use the term “harm” broadly 
to refer to a setback to an important interest.67 
1. Impoverished Consent 
The orthodox view is that contracts are enforceable only if parties validly consent 
to their terms.68 Indeed, consent has been described by one scholar as “the master 
concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States.”69 In describing the 
normative underpinnings of this legal requirement, another scholar describes an 
ideology according to which obtaining consent “almost always insulates the fairness 
of the terms of that contract from both public scrutiny and legal attack, regardless of 
how harmful or injurious that contract turns out to be to any of the parties that 
consented to it.”70 So beyond being a legal requirement of contract formation, 
consent also serves a widely accepted “legitimation” function.71 Valid consent 
constitutes a process that validates the terms of the agreement that parties have 
reached.72 
But scholars have long noticed a tension between consent’s role in contract 
formation and normative legitimation, on the one hand, and the realities of boilerplate 
contracting practices on the other.73 One of the chief complaints about boilerplate 
contracts holds that individuals surrender important rights under circumstances that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 33 
(1984). 
 68. See, e.g., Netbula, LLC v. BindView Dev. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1155 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“Under California law, in order to form a valid and enforceable contract, it is 
essential that there be: (1) parties capable of contracting; (2) their consent; (3) a lawful object; 
and, (4) a sufficient consideration.”); Ehlen v. Melvin, 823 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 2012) (“A 
contract requires parties capable of contracting, consent of the parties, a lawful object, and 
sufficient consideration.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994). 
 70. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1407 (2009). 
 71. Id. 
 72. For a more detailed discussion of the senses in which contract formation counts as a 
form of procedural justice, see Aditi Baghi, Contract as Procedural Justice, 7 JURIS. 47, 52–
53 (2016) (arguing that, under certain consent-based views, valid consent suffices to render 
contracts legally valid as well, and describing such views as examples of theories of pure 
procedural justice). 
 73. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 640 (warning, in 1943, about the excessive powers 
exercised by firms through their contracts of adhesion). 
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render their consent dubious at best.74 As applied to boilerplate accountability 
waivers, specifically, the objection assumes that the right to hold firms accountable 
in court (or in at least some forum) is important, yet individuals are divested of that 
right under conditions that render “consent” illusory.75  
Several features of boilerplate contracting practices drive this inadequate-consent 
argument. First, individuals are often ignorant about the content or meaning of 
accountability waivers contained in boilerplate agreements. Knowing whether we 
have given up rights pursuant to an accountability waiver would require individuals, 
at a minimum, to read all boilerplate that crosses our paths. But not only do 
consumers and employees fail to read boilerplate beyond a few key terms (especially, 
price conditions or what has been called “dickered” or “visible” terms),76 it is 
unreasonable—some have even called it “sadistic”—to expect consumers to read 
beyond a few key terms.77  
A few reasons people typically do not read the waivers stand out.78 First, even if 
people did read boilerplate, they would not necessarily appreciate its legal or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See, e.g., RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 30 (“The gerrymandering of the 
word ‘agreement,’ along with various other strategies for fitting [‘assent’ to boilerplate] into 
the . . . paradigm of voluntary transfer by agreement can be viewed as a process of the 
devolution or decay of the concept of voluntariness. In this process, consent is degraded to 
assent, then to fictional or constructive or hypothetical assent, then further to mere notice (i.e., 
something that tells recipients that terms are there), until finally we are left with only a fictional 
or constructive notice of the terms.”); James Gibson, Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 249, 255 (2018) (“Those who study contract law have accordingly formed a near-universal 
consensus that consumers simply do not voluntarily agree to late-arriving boilerplate (even if 
they click ‘I agree’ once its terms are presented) and that the necessary market discipline is 
therefore lacking.”); Kessler, supra note 11, at 640 (warning that contracts of adhesion may 
“become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords 
enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals”); 
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465 (2006) (“[I]n today’s electronic 
environment, the requirement of assent has withered away to the point where a majority of 
courts now reject any requirement that a party take any action at all demonstrating agreement 
to or even awareness of terms in order to be bound by those terms.”); Andrew Robertson, The 
Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 202 (2005) (concluding that the 
legal obligations that “commonly arise” in the context of standard form contracts occur in 
circumstances that “are clearly not best understood as voluntary obligations”); Sovern et al., 
supra note 28, at 82 (observing that empirical results “raise[] serious questions about whether 
the consent consumers provide when they enter into a contract containing an arbitration clause 
is a knowing consent, and therefore whether it should be considered consent at all”); see also 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF 
THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report 
_to_Congress_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ALP-Q69Q]. 
 75. See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 
267 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (observing that contracting practices 
falls short of “full consent”). 
 76. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1251. 
 77. KIM, supra note 59, at 65. 
 78. For a list similar to the one that follows, see RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 
12; see also OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
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practical import.79 Second, boilerplate terms are presented as non-negotiable,80 so 
there is nothing short of foregoing the individual transaction that they could do about 
it (often an illusory option, as discussed below). Third, as noted earlier in the context 
of exculpation clauses, some firms have a strong incentive to misrepresent legal 
rights and responsibilities in favor of those firms.81 Boilerplate often contains 
unenforceable terms, and there is very little incentive for drafters to avoid including 
them.82 But even a diligent reader would not know this absent further legal research.  
All of these explanations for why we typically do not read boilerplate assume that 
the consumer at least knows that that they are about to enter into some kind of legally 
enforceable arrangement. But in many cases involving so-called “wrap contracts” 
parties become legally bound without even realizing it.83 The same T-Mobile terms 
and conditions provide that one “accepts” those terms, among other ways, by opening 
the box containing the cell phone that comes bundled with the T-Mobile cellular 
service.84  
Beyond ignorance, boilerplate agreements have long been criticized to the extent 
that they offer individuals no meaningful choice about whether to waive certain 
important rights.85 This “no choice” worry also relates to consent, to the extent that 
the validity of consent depends on the chooser’s having a reasonable menu of options 
from which to choose. To illustrate the concern, consider the Department of 
Defense’s 2006 congressional report on the effects of predatory lending on service 
members. The Department observed that arbitration clauses prevented military 
personnel from seeking legal recourse in cour, adding that “[w]aiver is not a matter 
of ‘choice’ in take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion.”86 The Federal Trade 
Commission similarly opined in 2010 that “consumers should, but generally do not, 
have a meaningful choice regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in 
consumer credit contracts.”87  
                                                                                                                 
 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10, 61 (2014). 
 79. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1648 (2005) (“Empirical studies have shown that only a minute percentage of consumers 
read form agreements, and of these, only a smaller number understand what they read.”); see 
also Sovern et al., supra note 28, at 4, 15 (finding that “consumers lack awareness of 
arbitration agreements and do not understand those agreements when they are aware of them”). 
 80. Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1177. 
 81. See RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10. 
 82. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1127 (2009). For empirical support, see generally Furth-Matzkin, supra 
note 48. 
 83. KIM, supra note 59, at 3; see also Lemley, supra note 74, at 466. 
 84. T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/templates 
/popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions [https://perma.cc/2XFQ-EBSF] (last 
updated Aug. 22, 2018) (“You accept these terms by . . . opening the Device box.”). 
 85. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 86–87. 
 86. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT 
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 51 (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XFQ 
-EBSF]. 
 87. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN 
DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 45 (2010). 
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There are several reasons to think that boilerplate accountability waivers involve 
impoverished choice. Even if we somehow knew that a take-it-or-leave-it waiver of 
an important right appeared in the fine print, it is often unreasonable to expect us to 
“shop” for better terms given the high cost of doing so or low likelihood of finding 
materially different terms.88 What’s more, even if individuals could in theory shop 
around for better terms, in many markets we are unlikely to find a substitute good or 
service without a similar waiver. This is because competition frequently fails to weed 
out problematic terms.89 And this should come as little surprise. Problematic 
boilerplate terms including accountability waivers quickly become industry norms, 
at least when they are perceived by firms as cost-saving devices.90 Even Chief Justice 
Roberts commented during oral argument in Carpenter v. United States that “you 
really don’t have a choice these days if you want to have a cell phone.”91 He might 
just as well have added that you “don’t really have a choice” about whether your 
interactions with cell phone companies will be governed by boilerplate containing 
arbitration clauses. So not only does competition fail to weed out accountability 
waivers and other problematic terms, competition may in fact serve to entrench their 
use.92  
Our dependence on online commerce has made boilerplate even more 
unavoidable. Indeed, “[p]ractically every website professes to be governed by a 
browsewrap and/or clickwrap, and customers typically encounter several wrap 
agreements each time they go online.”93 The Canadian Supreme Court has even 
suggested that a particular firm’s services—Facebook, Inc.—are so enmeshed in our 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Douez v. Facebook, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (Can.) (“Having the choice to remain 
‘offline’ may not be a real choice in the Internet era.”); KIM, supra note 59, at 205 (“Even 
where a consumer is aware that she is ‘manifesting consent’ by clicking ‘I agree,’ her behavior 
is not so much an expression of intent to contract as it is a ceding to the reality of her 
situation—she clicks without reading because she knows that it does not matter what the 
contract says. If she wants to enter into any transaction online using a computer or mobile 
phone, she will accept all of the terms of each provider because she has no other choice.”); 
Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 700, 717 (1992) (“[P]urchasers 
would be acting irrationally if they incurred the costs required to fully comprehend all contract 
terms.”); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) (arguing that it is “rational for even a 
conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms”). 
 89. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 16–17 (2012); Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1227.  
 90. See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 1–11 (2015) (introducing the concept of a 
“phishing equilibrium” according to which competitive market pressures create incentives to 
manipulate and deceive consumers); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications 
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 589 (1998); Rakoff, supra note 16, at 
1227. 
 91. Transcript of Oral Argument at 80–81, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 
(2018) (No. 16-402). 
 92. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 90, at 1–11; BAR-GILL, supra note 89, at 16–17; 
Rakoff, supra note 16, at 1227. 
 93. KIM, supra note 59, at 59. 
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social lives that construing that firm’s services as avoidable seems unconvincing 
given the social costs of foregoing them.94 We must engage in at least some of these 
activities—online or offline—just to participate in a modern society and its 
commercial economy. And doing so almost always involves losing some important 
legal powers to hold those firms legally accountable for the harms they may inflict.95 
Despite these concerns about the validity of consent, courts and commentators 
continue to argue that enforcing accountability waivers is justified because 
individuals genuinely consent to them. The Supreme Court robustly enforces 
arbitration clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act in part because doing so “is a 
matter of consent.”96 Karl Llewellyn famously argued that “blanket assent” to 
unknown terms might be quite broad yet no less legitimate as a form of consent.97 
Roughly, the argument is that an individual genuinely consents to specific terms—
price, quantity, for example—while also giving “blanket assent . . . to any not 
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter 
or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”98 Llewellyn’s view 
continues to have adherents.99  
And there is at least a grain of truth in what Llewellyn argues. Rarely do 
individuals know all the facts that pertain to their commitments. So long as ignorance 
does not go to the heart of the underlying transaction—e.g., price terms or other core 
conditions of performance—ignorance may not undermine consent after all. In turn, 
determining whether accountability waivers count as “core conditions” will likely 
reproduce disagreements among partisans: boilerplate skeptics will argue that 
accountability waivers are core conditions, such that a contracting party’s ignorance 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Douez v. Facebook, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (Can.) (“As the intervener the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association emphasizes, access to Facebook and social media platforms, 
including the online communities they make possible, has become increasingly important for 
the exercise of free speech, freedom of association and for full participation in democracy.”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. One might think that the law helps to rein in abuse of accountability waivers, 
including unconscionability doctrine. For doubts about whether this is the case, see, e.g., KIM, 
supra note 59, at 87–92; RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 10, at 124–27; Meredith R. Miller, 
Contracting Out of Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability: An Argument 
Against Enforcement of Pre-dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (2008); 
see also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 486–87. 
For an argument in favor of reforming the doctrine, see KIM, supra note 59, at 208–10. 
 96. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
 97. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
370–71 (1960). 
 98. Id. at 370. 
 99. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Consent and Sensibility, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1967, 
1978 (2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)) (citing Llewellyn). For a more recent version of the 
view, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). 
The blanket-assent position shares with prominent contract-as-product views common 
features and motivations. See Erik Encarnacion, Contract as Commodified Promise, 71 VAND. 
L. REV. 61, 113–15 (2018). 
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of them undermines the validity of her consent, while boilerplate defenders will 
probably deny that accountability waivers count as core conditions. 
Setting ignorance aside, what about lack of meaningful choice? Here too consent-
based objections face difficulties. Consider one possible response: meaningful choice 
is not required for consent to be valid. Individuals may lack a meaningful choice 
about whether to consent to a life-saving surgery, for example, yet quite extensive 
liability waivers may be valid nonetheless.100 So long as consent is not secured 
through fraud, coercion, or duress—the response continues—lack of meaningful 
choice does not necessarily invalidate consent. If this response is correct, the fact that 
individuals lack a meaningful choice about whether to lose their rights under the 
terms of accountability waivers does not necessarily undermine the validity of those 
waivers.101 So objecting to accountability waivers on the grounds that individuals 
lack meaningful choice does not by itself show that those waivers are invalid.  
The preceding discussion has not traced all the contours of the debates about 
consent in the boilerplate context. But so far no decisive consent-based arguments 
for or against boilerplate terms generally or accountability waivers in particular have 
emerged. This stalemate has motivated boilerplate skeptics to focus on systemic 
harms or negative externalities beyond the immediate confines of individual 
boilerplate transactions. 
2. Systemic Harms 
There are other important criticisms of accountability waivers that focus, broadly 
speaking, on negative externalities—i.e., potential harms to third parties or 
institutions that are not party to a given boilerplate agreement. The particular 
criticisms that I will focus on are grounded in claims about the systemic effects of 
accountability waivers. Although commentators have identified multiple potential 
systemic harms at various levels of specificity, three will illustrate the point: harms 
to democratic self-governance, harms to courts, and harms to rule-of-law norms. All 
of these harms are complaints about the ways that accountability waivers degrade 
public institutions, norms, and values. 
Turning first to democratic self-governance, accountability waivers often 
undermine substantive and procedural rights and responsibilities codified in law by 
legal institutions like legislatures.102 But the overarching concern is that, given that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 135 n.36 (1996) (observing that “although we 
understand the sense in which a patient has ‘no choice’ but to undergo surgery, given that 
death is an intolerable alternative, we do not think that this fact . . . invalidates the patient’s 
‘informed consent’”). 
 101. Other theorists, rather than trying to argue that individuals meaningfully consent to 
boilerplate, opt instead to downplay the importance of consent. See, e.g., NATHAN B. OMAN, 
THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 156 
(2016) (arguing that contract theorists should stop trying to argue that boilerplate involves 
“meaningful” consent, and instead acknowledge that attenuated consent suffices for the 
purposes of facilitating functioning markets); see also Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 57 (2012) (arguing that 
“contract law abandon its consent-centric focus”). 
 102. See sources cited supra notes 9–12. 
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the chief aim of an accountability waiver is to keep disputes out of courts, these 
waivers make vindicating substantive legal rights much harder. This is especially so 
when the accountability waiver comes in the form of an arbitration clause that 
requires individual rather than class arbitration. Vindicating small-dollar claims in 
arbitration—let alone in court—becomes prohibitively expensive.103 Individual 
consumer claims, ranging from breach of contract to deceptive trade practices claims 
or other consumer protections—simply go unenforced. Violations of employee rights 
also become shielded from private actions to the extent they involve relatively small 
dollar amounts.104 And procedural devices that aim to facilitate justice—like the class 
action vehicle itself—also fall by the wayside.105 This entire dynamic effectively 
allows firms to opt out of large swaths of substantive and procedural law that depends 
heavily on private causes of action for enforcement, law with a robust democratic 
pedigree including antitrust and consumer and employee protections. 
Accountability waivers also potentially undermine courts.106 Focus again on 
arbitration clauses. To the extent that we view the court’s sole function as being one 
of efficient dispute resolution, taking cases away from the courts may not seem like 
a bad thing. But as many scholars have shown, dispute resolution is hardly the sole 
function of courts, and perhaps not even its more important one.107 One of the chief 
differences between public courts and private arbitration, for example, is that the 
former provides a relatively transparent process while the latter is typically secret.108 
The information-forcing function of courts comes in many forms. The discovery 
process unearths valuable public information about firms that plaintiffs value,109 and 
that have public benefits that extend beyond individual causes of action. Pre-
discovery filings also contain a wealth of information.110 Litigation that produces 
merits determinations often helps to clarify the law for those subject to it.111 Secret, 
private arbitration offers no such public benefit. 
There are, relatedly, serious rule-of-law concerns with boilerplate accountability 
waivers.112 Although the “rule of law” is a contested concept, certain values are 
closely associated with the ideal of living under a system of law rather than under 
arbitrary and capricious rule by individuals. And many of these values are 
undermined when individuals lack private power to hold firms legally accountable 
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in court. One such value is that the law on the books, as it were, should at least 
roughly reflect that law in practice (the value of “congruence”).113 But if large swaths 
of law go unenforced because individuals lack recourse, so much the worse for that 
rule-of-law value. Another value requires governments to make public what the law 
requires of them.114 Legal compliance requires to a large extent knowing and 
voluntary self-application of the law.115 But, as already noted, cutting off the 
production of case law hampers a key source of this public knowledge: binding 
precedent. And because voluntary compliance requires public knowledge of the 
law’s content, cutting off a source of legal knowledge potentially makes voluntary 
compliance more difficult as well. Formal equality under law is also associated with 
the rule of law.116 But when disputes are resolved in private rather than in public 
forums, the public is not in a position to evaluate whether arbitrators are complying 
with this norm. To the extent states stand by and willingly enforce accountability 
waivers, they seem to indirectly endorse or remain complicit with this kind of 
treatment. 
These and other potential systemic harms have been catalogued in greater detail 
elsewhere.117 For our purposes what unites these criticisms is that they focus squarely 
on the negative effects of accountability waivers beyond the alleged injustice to 
individual parties to the transaction. 
Because criticisms of boilerplate that focus on systemic harms are varied, global 
responses to these criticisms are not readily available. But one type of response 
comes in the form of tradeoff arguments. These arguments will be discussed at 
greater length in Part II below. To preview, tradeoff arguments promise that benefits 
flow from boilerplate waivers of important rights, and that these benefits outweigh 
costs or harms articulated by commentators worried about systemic harms.118 But for 
present purposes the important point is to recognize the distinction between consent-
based objections to boilerplate and objections grounded in concerns about systemic 
harms. 
II. THE INDIGNITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVERS 
Existing criticisms of boilerplate may have merit. But they also miss something 
important. Yes, systemic harms are worrisome. But focusing exclusively on these 
harms sidelines the ways firms mistreat individuals at the transactional level. Put 
differently, even if the negative externalities of boilerplate accountability waivers 
were minimal, the way that firms use boilerplate accountability waivers to establish 
relationships with individuals would remain problematic. Critics who emphasize 
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consent or the lack thereof, by contrast, do not ignore the possibility of transactional 
injustice between contracting parties. But they too miss something important. Yes, 
ignorance or lacking viable alternatives may very well undermine the validity of 
consent. But even if firms obtained knowing and valid consent, individuals would 
have good reason to resent being subjected to non-negotiable accountability waivers 
as a precondition of forming contractual relationships. And they would have good 
reason to resent this treatment before any consent is given. Consent does not launder 
all shameful treatment of individuals by firms.  
What the preceding objections overlook is that boilerplate accountability waivers 
threaten individuals’ dignity interests. In a moment I will substantiate this claim, but 
I first want to highlight the stakes up front. After all, the fact that private actors 
subject each other to indignity may initially seem unimportant or simply a regrettable 
fact of life, surely not the kind of fact that jeopardizes any interest that the law does 
or should protect.119 But as a broad proposition this claim is simply false. 
Governments protect individuals against reputational harms often couched in terms 
of protecting dignity.120 Courts justify anti-discrimination law in terms of dignity.121 
Executive Order 13,563 authorized federal agencies to consider “human dignity” in 
its cost-benefit analyses, despite acknowledging that dignity may be “difficult or 
impossible to quantify.”122 And the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on and 
recognized “dignity” as an interest worthy of protection by law.123 Even setting aside 
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the law’s contingent recognition that dignity is a freestanding and important interest, 
political theorists have argued that dignity holds an independent value that plays a 
crucial role for supporting or instantiating other democratic values like liberty and 
equality.124 So when private commercial practices like the imposition of 
accountability waivers represent a direct frontal attack on dignity, officials must take 
notice. 
Ultimately, my claim is that accountability waivers threaten our dignity interests 
by attempting to deny individuals the legal power to sue in court. I advance two 
arguments to support this conclusion. The first is couched in instrumental terms: that 
individuals have an interest in having access to institutions capable of vindicating 
their dignity, and courts play an irreplaceable role doing precisely this, given certain 
institutional features and legal powers that they have. The second argument is more 
formal: by putting individuals in the position of either giving up their rights to access 
court as a transactional precondition or walking away, firms treat individuals in a 
way incompatible with their dignity, where dignity is understood as an equal, high-
ranking status. The widespread practice of imposing accountability waivers on 
individuals effectuates a widespread “leveling down” incompatible with that high 
rank, while each person subjected to these conditions is placed in the humiliating 
condition of either degrading her rank or foregoing valuable opportunities. But 
before reaching these conclusions, more must be said about the conception of dignity 
presupposed here. 
A. The Concept and Value of Dignity 
1. The Concept of Dignity 
Dignity is a contested concept. But this Article nevertheless assumes, following 
Jeremy Waldron’s influential work,125 that dignity is a high rank or status held by 
each adult member of a political community. 
Let me explain. Broadly speaking there are two conceptions of dignity.126 The 
first interprets dignity as an inalienable attribute of every human person, “from the 
highest to the lowest . . . no matter what they do or what happens to them.”127 This 
view is usually attributed to Immanuel Kant, who famously described dignity as 
value without price that inheres in humanity, to the extent that humanity is capable 
of morality.128 The second has been described as rooted in the “old idea of dignity in 
the sense of the Roman dignitas—the status attached to a specific role or rank in a 
system of nobility and hierarchical office.”129 On this Roman view, dignity is a scarce 
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resource in the economy of esteem, certainly not the kind of thing capable of being 
distributed equally to each adult. 
The recent work of Jeremy Waldron has sparked a revival and revision of this 
second conception of dignity,130 one that attempts to reinterpret dignity in a way that 
in effect partially reconciles it with the Kantian conception’s egalitarian 
dimension.131 Waldron’s reinterpretation embraces the aristocratic connotations of 
the term “dignity.”132 Having dignity in this sense entails having a high social rank 
or status, as well as all the rights and responsibilities that come with that status.133 
Someone with dignity can also demand to be treated in certain ways by others, 
including to be treated with certain deference, solicitude, and respect.134 Modern 
liberal political communities that have attempted to abolish caste systems or systems 
of heritable nobility do not and should not aim to eliminate all of these aristocratic 
understandings of dignity. To the contrary, the project of liberation from royal 
hierarchies or other caste systems involves “leveling up,” by allocating aristocratic 
privileges once reserved for nobility to every person. Or as Waldron puts the point, 
“the modern notion of human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so 
that we now try to accord to every human being something of the dignity, rank, and 
expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility.”135 In a slogan, dignity 
is a high-ranking status held by each person in a community.  
Implicit in this conception are three constituents: status, high rank, and equality. 
Focus first on status. “Status,” in the relevant sense, refers to a social position that is 
constituted in part—but only in part—by rights and responsibilities. One’s marital 
status, for example, is constituted in part by a set of legal rights and responsibilities. 
But status cannot be explained completely by them.136 To illustrate, recall that 
defenders of gay marriage are not concerned merely with having a certain cluster of 
rights and responsibilities associated with legal marriage. Marital status has social 
meaning and intangible benefits beyond them.137 This is why recognizing “civil 
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unions” could not be a satisfactory substitute for full recognition of marriage between 
gay spouses, even if the formal legal attributes attending civil unions were identical 
to marital status.138 The “civil union” label signaled a less-than-full public 
recognition of the commitments that gay spouses had towards each other.139 That is, 
the label “civil union” expressed or communicated that certain legally recognized 
monogamous relationships were inferior to others, even if the same rights and 
responsibilities attached to both statuses. This shows that having a certain status 
implies having a certain standing in a community that is more than the sum of its 
constituent rights and responsibilities. 
But dignity is more than just any status. Having a low-ranking status may entail 
being an object of contempt, oppression, or humiliation across a range of social 
settings. But “dignity” has aristocratic connotations suggestive of a high-ranking 
status wholly inconsistent with this treatment.140 Historically, legal systems that 
recognized hereditary castes or royalty treat dignity as a scarce resource—an “elite 
peerage”—protected and exclusive in nature.141 The rights and responsibilities that 
partially constitute an elite status may themselves be quite desirable. And, as already 
noted, a person with dignity is also entitled by default to expect certain deferential, 
solicitous, and respectful treatment by others. Some entitlements more directly 
implicate high ranking than others. And not every rights infringement necessarily 
threatens one’s high ranking. Someone who accidentally and harmlessly trespasses 
on my property does not necessarily threaten my dignity. Indeed, not every 
“indignity” or insult—taken in isolation—will fundamentally threaten a person’s 
equal high rank. But, as I argue below, the right to hale others into court is tightly 
bound up with high-ranking status, both historically and normatively.142 
Finally, dignity entails more than a high-ranking status. The equal-high-ranking 
conception of dignity is partially aspirational, involving a norm of equality. 
According to this conception, liberal political communities that recognize the dignity 
of individuals aspire to “level up” by recognizing that all adults within those 
communities ought to be treated as if they were members of a high-ranking class.143 
Modern dignity in liberal political communities is—or should be—deeply opposed 
to conceptions of dignity according to which respectful treatment is bestowed 
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exclusively upon, say, a blue-blooded elite.144 Putting the pieces together, dignity is 
a high-ranking status held by each adult member of a political community in equal 
measure. This entails having the same basic set of legal rights and responsibilities, at 
a minimum, but also having an entitlement to demand (from others and institutions) 
solicitous, deferential, and respectful treatment befitting someone of high rank. 
Before turning to the question of dignity’s value, let me respond to some 
objections to avoid misunderstandings. One objection resists the very idea of an 
equal high-ranking status, which seems oxymoronic. Having a high rank presupposes 
that others have a lower rank. But if dignity requires that each person have the same 
high rank, then no one has a lower rank. So no high rank is possible, and in turn, it is 
impossible for anyone to have dignity.  
This objection misses its mark. One response is to point out that it is not obvious 
that children have dignity in the equal-high-rank conception of dignity. But setting 
aside the question of whether children have dignity in this sense, making sense of the 
idea of equal high rank simply requires understanding what low-ranking treatment 
involves. That is, having a basic understanding of caste systems or royal hierarchies, 
as they have existed either historically or persist today, is all that one needs by way 
of comparison to have a basic grip on what having a high rank might entail. And this 
is true even if (some day) nobody within a particular community occupies that low 
rank any more. So even though the idea of dignity as an equal, high-ranking status 
may sound oxymoronic, it is totally coherent. We do not need actually existing social 
stratification to understand or make use of this conception of dignity.145 
But there are more sophisticated versions of this objection. The first focuses on 
the fact that, historically at least, certain legal rights and social privileges were 
intelligible only assuming that there were low-ranking statuses. Certain privileges 
were “positional.”146 And we do not need to go very far back in time to see them. 
During the Jim Crow era, black Americans were expected to surrender their seats in 
the front of buses to white Americans. But how does the government universalize 
this practice, which essentially depends on racial hierarchies? Universalization, after 
all, is compatible with a range of practices, some of which remain morally abhorrent. 
A related problem with universalizing aristocratic rank is that aristocratic privileges 
often included a disturbing lack of accountability—something that would be 
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undesirable even if it were possible.147 Aristocrats did not have to answer to 
commoners.148 As Don Herzog summarizes the point, “at the heart of the dignity 
enjoyed by aristocrats was the claim, ‘I don’t have to answer to the likes of you.’”149 
These are important points that require a fuller discussion than can be undertaken 
here. Yes, sometimes universalizing the privileges of high rank is indeterminate or 
impossible. This seems a good thing to the extent that the positional entitlements 
involve lack of accountability to the “lower” orders. But the fact that universalizing 
eradicates “bad” positional entitlements looks more like a feature than a bug of 
Waldron’s conception. And yes, sometimes universalizing might be possible, but 
requires further reconstruction to avoid undesirable implications. A regime that 
permits white bus riders to demand black bus patrons to surrender their seats is not 
desirable even if black bus riders could respond in kind. But another answer to these 
more sophisticated objections is that dignity is not the only normative ideal available 
for determining how our legal and social institutions ought to be designed. Dignity 
still is capable of playing a powerful normative role, demanding that powerful 
institutions critically evaluate how they treat the highest-ranked within a political 
community, while further generalizing that treatment to all persons to the extent 
possible. But even though dignity cannot do all the normative work expected of a 
full moral and political theory, this does not mean it is incapable of doing any 
independent work at all. Indeed, dignity performs quite valuable work, as explained 
below. 
2. The Value of Dignity 
We should turn to dignity’s value. Understood as an equal high rank, individuals 
may value dignity for a number of reasons. This Article focuses mostly on the way 
that dignity instantiates an empowering form of relational equality. But to motivate 
that focus, first notice how political theorists have tried to locate dignity’s value in 
its relation to other values like democracy. Josiah Ober has argued, for example, that 
widespread dignity is a “necessary condition for democracy,” and claims that dignity 
and democracy exist in a “reciprocal relationship,” in which “[d]emocratic 
institutions defend dignity,” while “the habits of dignified citizens provide 
behavioral foundations for defending democracy.”150 This is because, according to 
Ober, dignity plays a necessary role in shoring up democracy’s two major values, 
liberty and equality.151 Living with indignity—understood as being systematically 
subjected to humiliating or infantilizing treatment—makes it impossible to 
effectively exercise our political liberties and is incompatible with equality.152 After 
all, individuals who lack secure dignity risk humiliation and infantilization.153 This 
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treatment, in turn, causes individuals to shrink from public roles and democratic 
participation, thereby weakening democracy in the process.154  
Surely Ober is correct that dignity matters for democracy. But his claim that 
dignity is a necessary precondition to democracy seems incorrect, at least when it is 
strictly construed. To see why, notice that the relationship between democracy and 
dignity, on Ober’s description, is an instrumental one and therefore contingent. 
Political communities that are treated with dignity may (per Ober) have robust 
democratic participation and vice versa. But not necessarily. The current occupant of 
the White House is not well known for treating his political opponents with dignity, 
yet his attempts to humiliate and bully them may very well motivate democratic 
participation.155 What’s more, unless we have a more concrete understanding of what 
equal high rank entails, having this rank may just as well breed complacency and 
indifference towards the underlying political institution that sustains it. Dignity may 
matter for democracy instrumentally and vice versa. But their relationship is more 
complicated than Ober lets on. 
A better understanding of dignity’s value will not be so contingent. Instead, I want 
to elaborate on the value that bears a constitutive rather than instrumental relation to 
dignity wherever it is manifested. Dignity is an equal-high-ranking status partially 
constituted by a set of rights and responsibilities. But once again this set of rights and 
responsibilities partly—and only partly—explains the value of dignity.156 The 
distinctive value of dignity inheres in the way that equal high ranking allows 
individuals to stand in a relationship as equals with one another in a political 
community, while being empowered to vindicate that membership status.  
The equality here is a form of relational equality.157 At minimum, dignity rejects 
caste systems that stigmatize, marginalize, or otherwise oppress individuals 
throughout a range of social settings that they may encounter or participate in. 
Dignity does not require having the same high rank in every institution one 
participates in. Not everyone will be CEO. But dignity demands that one will not be 
systematically and predictably treated as less worthy of consideration across a wide 
range of social settings. More positively, the idea is that all institutions within a 
community treat individuals as though they have a high rank. We are all members of 
an “elite peerage” and are entitled to, in addition to certain basic rights and 
responsibilities, a basic level of solicitude, deference, and respect from one another 
and from institutions—and, moreover, we are empowered (befitting our high rank) 
to demand those things from others if they are not forthcoming.158 True, having an 
equal high rank and all of its accouterments may be instrumentally useful to us in a 
variety of ways. But it is also intrinsically valuable.  
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This is all quite abstract. But sometimes we see dignity’s distinctive value most 
clearly when it is threatened. Return again to marital status, which usefully illustrates 
how dignity may be jeopardized in ways that extend beyond the mere violation of 
the rights that underpin it.159 In its pre-Obergefell decision, Opinion of the Justices 
to the Senate, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a 
proposed bill—providing that same-sex “‘spouses’ in a civil union shall be ‘joined 
in it with a legal status equivalent to marriage’” in all but name—would pass muster 
under the state’s constitution.160 The court held that the proposed bill would violate 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Massachusetts constitution,161 
reasoning that the legislature’s labeling was not “innocuous”; rather, “it is a 
considered choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, 
largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.”162 In other words, by 
“relegat[ing] same-sex couples to a different status,”163 the civil union bill would 
have harmed the dignity interests of gay spouses despite formally having the same 
benefits and burdens as opposite-sex “married” couples. 
The Opinion of the Justices usefully illustrates a few lessons. The first reinforces 
a conceptual point about status: that status is something over and above a 
constellation of legal rights and responsibilities, even though those same rights and 
responsibilities partially constitute a status. The second lesson follows from the first. 
The value of marital status is not exhausted by the value of the underlying set of 
rights and responsibilities. To the extent that calling committed relationships “civil 
unions” rather than “marriages” signaled, in context, a subordinate status that was 
flatly inconsistent with treating individuals as having an equal high rank. The 
labeling difference was not merely semantic; it represented a mark of inferiority 
inconsistent with possessing a high rank. What was valuable to gay couples, and what 
was being threatened by the bill, was their standing to demand the same solicitude, 
deference, and respect afforded straight couples across a broad range of social 
settings, over and above the set of legal rights and responsibilities that come with 
marriage. 
One final point is worth emphasizing. The notion of high rank plays an important 
role, if unstated, over and above equality. Suppose that the Massachusetts legislature, 
rather than recognize gay marriage, simply eliminated marriage or started to label all 
marriages “civil unions.” These two reactions would have secured some measure of 
formal equality, in principle accessible to each person. But in context, this maneuver 
would clearly signal that the legislature was attempting to “level down” rather than 
afford gay couples the same status previously afforded exclusively to straight ones. 
This maneuver would be no more legitimate than attempts by Southern states to shut 
down public schools rather than integrate them.164 So the notion of high rank is 
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capable of performing independent normative work, and captures some value 
independent of formal equality of treatment or abstract notions of relational equality 
by themselves. 
As with marital status, so too with dignity conceived of as an equal high rank. 
One’s dignity, like marital status, cuts across a variety of legal, institutional, and 
social settings and has normative force that goes beyond a cluster of rights and 
responsibilities. When a person’s dignity is jeopardized, this does not merely or even 
necessarily mean that a particular right has been violated—though curtailing some 
rights may threaten a person’s high-ranking status depending on context.165 
Jeopardizing a person’s dignity interests means threatening an individual’s high 
standing in a political community of equals, something that is of intrinsic rather than 
merely instrumental value.166 
And this understanding of dignity helps to answer a common objection to it, which 
is that dignity is too vague to be normatively useful. Understanding dignity as a high 
rank is useful because it forces us to ask questions that a purely rights-based inquiry 
does not comfortably ask.167 Taking dignity seriously involves asking whether 
certain patterns of contemptuous behavior jeopardize our standing in a way that may 
negatively affect our relationships with others over a range of social settings. Taking 
dignity seriously invites us, in other words, to identify harms that extend beyond 
discrete “transactional” harms to our interests in our bodily integrity, property, or 
free choice.  
But identifying genuine threats to individual dignity is not always easy. Still, the 
threats discussed below raise particular concerns because they do not merely involve 
discrete expressions of contempt inconsistent with our dignity. Rather, boilerplate 
accountability waivers pose a threat to individual dignity by trying to deprive us of 
an important vehicle for vindicating our high ranking: public courts. 
B. How Accountability Waivers Jeopardize Dignity 
As previewed above, I offer two arguments for why boilerplate accountability 
waivers threaten dignity. First, accountability waivers attempt to deny individuals a 
vehicle—the legal power to sue in court—crucial for vindicating a person’s high rank 
or standing as an equal in a liberal political community. This first argument leans 
heavily on the aspect of dignity that interprets it as a status, and focuses in turn on 
the status-vindicating powers of courts. The second argument claims that having 
access to courts comes along with having a high rank. This argument thus leans more 
heavily on the high rank aspect of dignity. Although independent, the arguments are 
mutually reinforcing. 
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1. The Instrumental Argument: How Courts Vindicate Dignity 
Courts play a special instrumental role in vindicating individual dignity.168 This 
is because courts are capable of lending their prestige and power to litigants. Because 
vindicating one’s dignity involves defeating or mitigating challenges to it, 
understanding how courts are uniquely situated to vindicate status first requires 
understanding how a person’s status can be challenged. Sometimes certain 
substantive legal rights directly protect a person’s status, such that violating these 
rights per se challenge a person’s status. For example, defamation claims protect 
against reputational harms and allow individuals to protect their “good names.”169  
Claims of wrongful discrimination also provide a compelling example. When one 
person wrongfully discriminates against another, that discriminator’s conduct 
frequently expresses the judgment that the victim is somehow of lesser importance 
on the basis of a protected aspect of that person’s identity. To generalize, rights 
violations can intrinsically threaten a person’s status when those rights themselves 
aim to protect a person’s standing in a community. 
Apart from individual rights violations, lacking the ability to stand up for one’s 
self against legal transgressions, and lacking the ability to do so in court, represents 
a potential threat to one’s high-ranking status.170 To see why, recall that a person’s 
status accompanies her through a wide range of social settings. As Don Herzog puts 
the point, having an “[a]ristocratic status,” entails that “your status follows you 
across the whole social landscape . . . [y]ou’re a duke 24/7.”171 But this suggests that 
a threat to a person’s dignity anywhere might be a threat to that status everywhere. 
Having the power to sue in court is not just a matter of seeking compensation from a 
particular defendant. The power enables a person to stand up and publicly affirm to 
the broader community that treating her a certain way is simply not acceptable—that 
one is not to be trifled with.172 
Courts play an important role in vindicating status in the face of these potential 
challenges. Several features prove helpful in vindicating status. Courts have prestige. 
This prestige is manifested aesthetically through architecture,173 rituals, and through 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite—The Norman Shachoy 
Lecture, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 808 (2008). 
 169. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 185 (2016). 
 170. Jason Solomon and Scott Hershovitz, respectively, emphasize that lawsuits empower 
individuals to stand up for themselves in public. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability 
Through Tort Law, 103 NW. L. REV. 1765, 1797, 1814 (2009); Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a 
Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 86, 96 (John 
Oberdiek ed., 2014). Hershovitz in particular emphasizes how lawsuits force defendants to 
publicly confront accusations of wrongdoing in a way that aims in part to reaffirm the social 
standing of plaintiffs. Every wrongdoing, according to Hershovitz, poses a threat to a person’s 
standing; responding to that threat, especially through the public mechanism of lawsuits, 
involves fighting back against those threats. See Hershovitz, supra, at 97; see also Hershovitz, 
supra note 145. Not every legal wrongdoing jeopardizes a person’s social standing. 
Systematically denying individuals access to full trial proceedings, however, does. 
 171. Herzog, supra note 146, at 108. 
 172. Scott Hershovitz has explored similar themes in recent work. See, e.g., Hershovitz, 
supra note 145, at 32. 
 173. Architects try to emphasize this “prestige and dignity” when designing courthouses. 
1334 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1305 
 
the clothing judges wear, whether wigs or robes or both. Beyond aesthetics, courts 
have authority: they have the power to make decisions binding on parties. Everyone 
within a jurisdiction is expected to comply with these rulings when they are parties 
to a dispute. To back up these expectations, courts have the power to hold non-
complying parties in contempt. And even third parties not party to a particular dispute 
must respect or accommodate court decisions, given that courts set precedent. In 
other words, all institutions within a jurisdiction must defer to courts. Last but not 
least, courts are public authorities: their proceedings are by and large public, and 
their findings of fact and conclusions of law are public.  
These commonplaces about courts show why they can play an especially valuable 
role in vindicating not only an individual’s rights, but also her dignity. Precisely 
because courts have prestige and actual legal power to command deference from 
other institutions within a jurisdiction, and precisely because this prestige and power 
is exercised in public for all to see, courts are uniquely situated to publicly vindicate 
a person’s high ranking across a wide range of institutions. Because status “follows 
you across the whole social landscape,”174 institutions capable of demanding 
deference and respect from other institutions—and doing so publicly—make courts 
especially valuable for vindicating one’s dignity across that landscape. In short, 
courts vindicate dignity by lending their prestige and power to individuals, as if to 
say, “I, sitting up on high, am with you—and everyone else should be, too.” 
This is not to say courts are perfect. They make mistakes. And in many cases 
individuals might prefer not to air their dirty laundry in public. Plaintiffs are not 
always perfectly well behaved and may be subjected to ridicule (warranted or not). 
So sometimes it might very well be in a plaintiff’s interests to make sure that certain 
facts do not become well known. As Scott Hershovitz observes, “public trials can be 
a public spectacle, which puts some plaintiffs to the choice of compromising their 
dignity in one way, so that they can vindicate it in another.”175 Arbitration may, in 
many contexts, actually provide a method of dispute resolution capable of better 
protecting individual dignity. Accordingly, this Article seeks to avoid disparaging all 
forms of alternative dispute resolution in all contexts. 
But boilerplate accountability waivers still raise a special problem. They attach to 
a person and preclude her access to courts before any dispute arises. Nominally, these 
waivers preserve some method of dispute resolution. But when they work as they are 
designed to, they keep disputes out of courts entirely, often without regard to the 
nature of the dispute, and regardless of whether a person has suffered from a 
wrongdoing that jeopardizes her dignity. Plaintiffs not only lose a forum for 
protecting their legal rights, they lose a potentially powerful ally (courts) in the 
attempt to protect their standing as full adults within a broader community. They 
cannot use courts to give that standing a “signal boost” and, in turn, to vindicate their 
status. This is how boilerplate accountability waivers instrumentally harm an 
individual’s dignity interests: individuals have an interest in using courts to vindicate 
their standing once they become aware of a particular wrongdoing. 
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Of course the court’s ability to publicly vindicate a person’s dignity means more 
to some people than others. Bill Gates may face mandatory arbitration just like we 
all do when we click “I agree.” But in many other legal and social contexts he will 
be treated with the solicitude, deference, and respect of someone with dignity. Many 
of us are not so lucky. Indeed, the right to sue in court represents one of the few ways 
the weakest may, in principle, uphold their dignity by holding the strongest 
accountable—as equals—for their transgressions. In a vivid expression of this idea, 
one attorney representing his client’s claims against BP oil company insisted that 
“[t]here is only one place where a waitress or a shrimper can be on equal footing with 
a company the size of BP, and that’s a courtroom.”176  
Beyond the indignity that lacking access to courts would involve—the inability 
of an individual to even try to force a more powerful party to take her seriously—
distributional harms may follow as well. The inequality between a shrimper and BP 
is an economic one. But without access to courts this kind of economic disparity is 
potentially compounded, insofar as it gives more powerful firms a tool for a one-way 
extraction of wealth from the pockets of certain potential future litigants to the firm’s 
bottom line.177  
But something more is at stake than the unilateral extraction of wealth. Quite apart 
from compounding economic inequalities, accountability waivers—although facially 
neutral—disparately impact members of social groups who face ongoing struggles 
for dignity. Women and racial, sexual, and religious minorities have long fought for 
social recognition as equals—as equally worthy of respect as possessors of dignity.178 
Dignity, as presupposed in this Article, is a high rank that attaches to a person 
throughout the various institutional roles or social relationships she occupies or 
engages in. But dignity, in this sense, is also one that historically and 
contemporaneously has not been afforded to everyone. And although courts have not 
always consistently helped in securing equal dignity for members of historically 
marginalized groups, the ability of courts to set public precedent has been 
instrumental to securing whatever advances that have come.179 Members of social 
groups who have struggled to gain recognition as possessors of this equal-high-rank 
lose an important battleground when they lose access to courts. In this context, where 
courts have played such an important public role in shoring up dignity interests—not 
just against state but also against private attempts to exclude and degrade—the facial 
neutrality of accountability waivers masks a disparately felt impact of those waivers 
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on individuals still engaged in that struggle for social recognition as possessors of 
full social status. 
In sum, accountability waivers harm our dignity interests. Legal wrongdoings do 
not just violate our rights, they sometimes threaten our standing in a political 
community. Courts play an important and unique role in vindicating that status in 
ways that cannot be fully replicated by other institutions. But by preventing us from 
accessing courts before legal wrongdoing arises, accountability waivers make it the 
case that we are not in a position to determine whether courts are needed to vindicate 
our status. This sets back our interests in protecting our dignity, and thus harms it. 
2. The Argument from Form: Against Leveling Down 
The previous argument focused on the status aspect of dignity, and in particular, 
the status-protecting function of courts. The present argument will emphasize the 
high rank aspect of dignity. That is, the argument here is that dignity rejects leveling 
down important rights traditionally constitutive of high-ranking status. The right to 
sue in court partially constitutes one’s high-ranking status as an adult person. 
Boilerplate accountability waivers degrade this status directly by effectively 
depriving people of their legal right to sue in court, and indirectly, by simply putting 
them in a degrading position of having to effectively trade away rights to court as a 
condition of commercial exchange. In short, accountability waivers ask us to level 
down. 
This argument begins, like the last one, by briefly rehearsing the high-rank 
conception of dignity. This conception suggests a certain normative methodology to 
test which privileges, at a minimum, should be afforded to everyone—or at least 
every adult within a political community. The methodology begins by identifying the 
rights and responsibilities that have traditionally attached to persons with high-
ranking social statuses and urges the state to universalize that treatment where 
possible.180 Notice that this line of inquiry does not wholly eschew historical 
practices; the fact that this conception of dignity is partly rooted in existing legal and 
historical practices explains how the conception is capable of rendering relatively 
concrete judgments about the dignity or indignity of present-day acts and practices. 
Protecting dignity requires a political community to ensure that each person has the 
rights and responsibilities, in some form, traditionally afforded to members of elite 
classes. If so, theorists must be in a position to identify these rights and 
responsibilities. 
The right to stand up for oneself in court has traditionally been held by high-
ranking members of societies. The claim that the legal power to sue in court is an 
important marker of high-ranking status is hardly novel. Sometimes the idea is 
expressed in terms of citizenship. In his highly influential essay, Citizenship and 
Social Class, T.H. Marshall emphasizes “the right to defend and assert all one’s 
rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law[]” as vitally 
important to citizenship, adding that “the institutions most directly associated with 
civil rights are the courts of justice.”181 The connection between full adult citizenship 
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and the right to sue also has deep historical roots. Avishai Margalit observes, “[i]n 
ancient Rome, citizens enjoyed special public privileges, such as voting at 
assemblies, army service, the right to hold public office, and the legal right to sue 
and to defend themselves against suits.”182 And John Goldberg’s extended meditation 
on the constitutional status of private law in the United States describes the deep 
roots of the power to bring an action for redress, both as a matter of intellectual 
history and in the common law tradition.183  
Elite peerage, however, carries with it many privileges and perhaps some of them 
do not implicate dignity interests. But the legal power to hale others into court bears 
an especially close relationship to the dignity of adulthood. Counted among the 
privileges of this dignified-high-ranking, according to Waldron, are legal rights that 
empower individuals to “stand up for themselves,” “make unapologetic claims on 
their own behalf,” and “control the pursuit and prosecution of their own 
grievances.”184 These privileges—no longer allocated exclusively to nobility—ought 
to extend to include everyone. So too must the same right to stand up for oneself by 
choosing whether and how to hale others into court.185 
And it is little wonder why. Part of what it means to have a high rank—a full adult 
in a liberal community—means having legal rights. And not just the veneer of rights. 
Having rights requires being in a position to make legal demands on others and 
expect that others defer to those demands when valid. Making these demands 
credible, in turn, requires access to actual remedies for when those rights are violated. 
As Margaret Radin correctly emphasizes, “if legal rights cannot be empty vessels, 
and if the principle of equality before the law is honoured in practice, all rights 
holders must have reasonable access to remedies.”186 Radin’s primary concern in 
context is systemic, insofar as she emphasizes the way that boilerplate promotes 
democratic degradation and undermines the rule of law.187 But others have observed 
that part of what it means to have dignity is to be a rights holder, which in turn means 
that one will be in a position to “stand” on those rights.188 So close is the connection 
between having legal rights and human dignity that it has been suggested that human 
dignity might be nothing over and above “the recognizable capacity to assert 
claims.”189 Although for reasons already given this is not quite correct,190 the 
recognizable capacity to assert legal claims does partially constitute one’s high rank. 
Accountability waivers degrade this capacity and in turn degrade one’s standing 
as a full adult with dignity. After all, depriving individuals of their right to stand up 
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for themselves in court is notoriously linked to placing them in a low-ranking status. 
Unlike “[h]igh-ranking persons” whose “word and testimony would be taken 
seriously,” and who “would be entitled to the benefit of elaborate processes,” such 
low-ranking persons “would not have the privilege of bringing suit in the courts, or 
if they were it would have to be under someone else’s protection; they were not, as 
we sometimes say, sui iuris.”191 Indeed, we do not even need to imagine caste 
societies in which one’s inability to bring others into court serves as a marker of 
inferiority. Systematically depriving individuals of the right to sue others in court is 
notoriously linked with disrespectful treatment and institutionalized humiliation of 
historically disfavored groups.192  
And lacking the capacity to stand up for oneself can be deeply humiliating, indeed. 
Nathan Oman recounts a vignette from A Tale of Two Cities in which “Marquis 
Evremonde, driving his carriage recklessly through the streets of Paris, kills the 
young son of a humble sans culotte named Gaspard.”193 The Marquis—described as 
“selfish, thoughtless of others, and cruel”194—flings a coin at the man as 
compensation and drives away.195 Importantly, Gaspard lacked “all avenues of action 
against the Marquis” as a consequence of the French ancien régime, which in turn, 
“deprive[d] Gaspard of any means of vindicating his honor against this 
humiliation.”196 Because Gaspard lacked any legal means of standing up for himself 
and his son, Gaspard was, in Oman’s apt phrase, “made complicit in his own 
humiliation.”197 The fact that Gaspard and others like him lacked avenues for redress 
against higher-ranking members of society was a part of France’s formal social 
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hierarchy at the time.198 Lower class members of society were formally less than full 
adult citizens.  
But these lofty abstractions about the connection between the right to sue and our 
full status as citizens, as well as comparisons with formal caste societies, might invite 
skepticism. Most obviously, the situation of consumers and employees subject to 
boilerplate accountability waivers is not yet as dire as Gaspard’s situation. For one 
thing, Bill Gates is just as much bound to arbitrate certain consumer transactions as 
anyone else. There is no special class of citizens wholly exempted from arbitration 
clauses as there was a special class of nobility exempted from suits by commoners. 
For another thing, some consumers and employees still retain some avenues for 
recourse against firms that wrong them, depending on the nature of the wrongdoing. 
Even if individuals systematically lacked access to courts, they at least have (in 
principle) access to arbitration. We should not fetishize courts, critics might argue. 
And even if individuals lacked access to courts, one might object, individuals could 
still (in principle) appeal to the legislatures and state attorneys general to vindicate 
their rights. Finally, many consumers and employees might happily give up their 
right to sue in court in exchange for the promise of lower prices, higher quality goods 
and services, higher wages, or more employment opportunities. The idea that the 
right to sue in court is central to our status as adult citizens is untethered from reality, 
one might argue, a reality in which individuals rarely if ever think about suing others, 
let alone desire to do so. 
Still, we must be careful not to underestimate the importance of having access to 
courts, and more specifically the value of having the right to sue others who wrong 
us. Each of the preceding responses endorse, in effect, the claim that “leveling down” 
is permissible and compatible with individual dignity provided that we get some 
tangible benefits. Bill Gates cannot access courts for his consumer disputes; 
accordingly, the thought continues, it is permissible that we too lack such access. In 
the same vein, most of us won’t sue or won’t want to sue, so we can all “level down” 
even though some of us may not wish to; arbitration is good enough to the extent that 
it allows us to speak up.  
All of these responses may be compatible with some formal conception of 
equality and even status. But all of these responses fail to come to grips with the 
notion that dignity counts as a high-ranking status, where rank is compared by 
reference to baselines of treatment afforded the highest-ranking members of society. 
High-ranking members historically have had the option to go to court, we may 
plausibly insist, yet boilerplate accountability waivers—when they succeed—
prevent us from doing so. Backsliding is not defensible simply on the grounds that it 
is widespread. 
C. Objections 
1. Consent Revisited 
At first glance, perhaps the weightiest response to the problem of boilerplate 
indignity is to insist that individuals consent to or voluntarily choose this treatment, 
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regardless of whether it infringes on their dignity. The “moral magic” of consent is 
that it is supposed to transform otherwise serious misconduct into morally 
permissible behavior, while respecting the interests of those subject to that treatment 
by respecting their authority to decide what happens to them.199 In the context of 
boilerplate accountability waivers in particular, the claim is simple: consumers and 
employees genuinely consent to accountability waivers.200 When we sign on the 
dotted line, or click “I accept,” the argument goes, we consent to being legally bound 
to the terms contained in the boilerplate, even those terms about which we are 
ignorant. Knowing little about what we consent to does not negate the consent. In 
fact, the argument goes, most consent involves some ignorance on the part of the 
consenting party. We do not know precisely what goes on under the knife when 
surgeons operate on us. Nor do we know everything about the hardware and software 
that helps our computers run. Still, we somehow manage to successfully consent to 
surgery and voluntarily purchase computers.201 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
occasionally intones that robustly enforcing arbitration clauses under the Federal 
Arbitration Act “is a matter of consent.”202 Accordingly, even if accountability 
waivers damage a person’s dignity, so what? Individuals validly consent to that 
treatment. Consent is the only thing that matters here. 
Criticisms of consent-based justifications favoring enforcement of boilerplate 
have been articulated at length elsewhere, as well as above,203 so I will not rehearse 
all of them here.204 Suffice it to say that even proponents of consent-based arguments 
admit that consent or assent will not validate every item contained in fine print.205 If 
so, consent does not make much progress in determining which boilerplate terms 
should be enforced because it leads back to “basic questions,”206 including which 
principles should determine the limits of contractual consent. 
 This dialectic has been discussed above already.207 But consider some other 
responses that have received less attention. First, consent does not provide the right 
kind of reason to justify the social practices of imposing and enforcing accountability 
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waivers on individuals. That is, even if a proposed transaction is consensual or fully 
voluntary, that does not necessarily justify social practices that make those proposals 
available or place them beyond legitimate criticism.208 Critics of boilerplate that 
focus on systemic harms implicitly adopt this criticism. 
But the dignity-based objection presented here is not simply a complaint against 
certain social practices (though that it is). A motivation for the arguments above is 
that there remains an individual threat to dignity interests of the individual regardless 
of whether a person ultimately “consents.” This suggests another answer to the 
consent objection: certain offers are themselves affronts to dignity interests 
regardless of whether the offeree ultimately accepts those offers. Elizabeth Anderson 
puts a similar point as follows: “Consent to an option within a set cannot justify the 
option set itself.”209 In its original context, Anderson aims to rebut a common idea 
about consent in relation to employment: that because we consent to employment, 
this effectively legitimizes a broad range of mistreatment by the employer against us 
so long as we have a robust power to exit.210 But we can generalize the point: when 
one evaluates the moral permissibility of a menu of options, an individual’s choosing 
an option off that menu will not suffice to validate the menu as a whole.  
Examples might help to illustrate. Suppose that someone credibly offers you a 
choice between taking a $1000 gift or a bullet to the foot.211 The fact that you choose 
the money voluntarily does not thereby legitimize the offeror’s decision to present 
you with those options, even if your life is overall much better off as a result of deal. 
The menu you are offered still warrants moral criticism, even though you have the 
option to exit, because sometimes practices of making particular offers are 
themselves morally wrong even if individuals remain free to walk away.212 Consider 
another example. During the Jim Crow era, some African Americans used racially 
segregated water fountains in the United States. But this obviously does not serve to 
justify the practice of racially segregating water fountains or racial segregation more 
broadly, even if one could voluntarily decline to use them.213 When the very social 
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practices that establish our options are called into question, individual, case-by-case 
selections of one of those options cannot justify the entire set. But even if exactly 
one establishment offered racially segregated water fountains—rather than 
widespread social practice—this too would be impermissible even if some 
individuals chose to use those fountains.214 
Dignity-depriving offers are especially suspect. Even the most fervent proponents 
of the freedom of contract recognize that certain things cannot be bargained away. 
John Stuart Mill denied that governments should enforce contracts purporting to sell 
oneself into slavery.215 We might add to the list of inalienable rights the right to vote, 
bankruptcy protection, or the right to file a claim grounded in Title VII. Similarly, 
even if we accept that labor, certain rights, and promises are frequently market 
alienable,216 interests that implicate a person’s dignity—such as our interests against 
being humiliated or treated with contempt—are different.217 Making a waiver of a 
person’s dignity interests a condition of exchange is not a trade that the state must 
necessarily stand willing to enforce. When dignity is jeopardized, unhindered 
freedom of contract no longer holds. 
Notice that these objections to the consent-based rationale do not deny that 
individuals consent to boilerplate218 or that blanket assent reflects the kind of robust 
consent presupposed by contract law.219 The objection is independent of these 
concerns; it denies that individual consent provides the right kind of rationale for 
offering, imposing, and enforcing accountability waivers even if there is a sense in 
which individuals may opt to invoke them “voluntarily.” The important point to 
remember is that even if individuals voluntarily adopt boilerplate that they know 
contains liability waivers, this does not suffice to justify the offers. 
2. Tradeoff Arguments 
One of the most prominent defenses of accountability waivers comes in the form 
of tradeoff arguments. The key idea is this: allowing consumers or employees to 
retain rather than waive their accountability rights—e.g., rights to sue in conveniently 
located courts of law rather than requiring private arbitration at the firm’s 
convenience—makes those who “commit” to boilerplate, including its accountability 
waivers, better off than the alternatives. As we will see in a moment, different 
tradeoff arguments tell different stories about what being “better off” entails.  
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This Section makes two points. First, tradeoff arguments prove too much and 
provide no room for inalienable rights, and second, tradeoff arguments are 
themselves incompatible with dignity to the extent that they express a contemptuous 
form of paternalism when voiced by firms seeking to prevent public adjudication. 
Before reaching these conclusions, consider how tradeoff arguments are used to 
defend accountability waivers. Omri Ben-Shahar usefully presents a wholly 
generalized version of the argument in defense of boilerplate waivers of “important” 
rights: 
Let us begin by assuming that the rights that boilerplates delete are 
important. . . . The immediate implication of this assumption is that a 
product + boilerplate bundle that deletes these rights eliminates 
important fragments of value and thus saves the firms some of the costs 
of doing business. This cost saving allows firms that offer the depleted 
bundle to charge a lower price. Standard economics analysis shows that 
this implication holds regardless of the market power that firms have. It 
is possible that not all cost savings would accrue to consumers through 
lower prices. But it is hard to imagine that the savings due to, say, stingy 
warranties or restricted use of information products, would have no price 
effect.220 
Ben-Shahar worries that protecting too many rights against waiver may have the 
effect of raising prices and excluding too many people from the market. But he also 
goes further, speculating that “[t]here is plenty of reason to think that for most people, 
getting a lower price is the overriding goal.”221 
Although Ben-Shahar’s tradeoff argument is wholly general insofar as it purports 
to justify the practice of allowing firms to impose accountability waivers and does 
so on the basis of lower prices, tradeoff arguments have been offered to defend 
arbitration specifically. Consider, for example, AT&T’s arguments in the Ninth 
Circuit in Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC (later captioned AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion when AT&T petitioned to the Supreme Court).222 The litigation involved 
a class action against AT&T, which complained about the company’s practice of 
charging customers taxes for “free phones” offered in exchange for agreeing to 
cellular service contracts.223 As noted in the introduction, the case raised the question 
of whether arbitration clauses were enforceable despite lower court findings that they 
were unconscionable under state law.224 Important for present purposes, AT&T 
explicitly argued on appeal in the Ninth Circuit that the Concepcions—the class 
representatives—were “better off in individual arbitration than as class 
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representatives.”225 Specifically, AT&T claimed that “revised arbitration provision 
substantially exceed the typical incentive payments awarded to class representatives 
as part of court-approved settlement agreements;”226 that arbitration was quicker and 
easier;227 and that the Concepcions were particularly likely to achieve a satisfactory 
result.228 
Initially, tradeoff arguments may seem compelling, insofar as they present 
accountability waivers as ultimately good for consumers and employees. Now, it 
should be noted that the empirical case for these claims is not rock solid, to say the 
least.229 But put aside the empirical questions. Instead, notice two problems with the 
tradeoff argument that exist regardless of how the empirical question is resolved.  
First, tradeoff arguments contain no limiting principle; they prove too much. By their 
reasoning, there is simply no reason to think that we should have any legal power to 
hold firms accountable in courts or some other form of alternative dispute resolution. 
After all, the chances that we’ll need to invoke some adjudication or arbitration may 
be quite small. And the promised “benefits”—lower prices or higher quality goods 
or services—seem worth the risk. But if the total abrogation of accountability seems 
a bridge too far—and it is—then tradeoff arguments do not in principle rule them 
out. A major problem with these arguments, as Margaret Radin rightly points out, is 
that certain rights are and should be “in the care of the polity”230 and are subject to 
restraints on alienation. One’s right to vote or obligation to serve on juries or register 
for selective service are among those inalienable rights. One’s status as a person with 
dignity, I submit, also falls within this category: one’s dignity demands respect from 
others that “typically overrides other kinds of considerations and typically prohibits 
sacrificing the dignity of a single person for the greater well-being or even the dignity 
of others.”231 The point that dignity is not readily fungible with lower prices is a point 
widely accepted.232 
This is not to say that it is easy to determine the moral limits of tradeoff arguments 
like Ben-Shahar’s. But if there is some principled limit on tradeoff arguments, the 
debate simply becomes where to place that limit. The position of this Article has 
been that boilerplate accountability waivers that aim to prevent access to courts cross 
the line, wherever it is ultimately located. 
But consider another response to this tradeoff argument, which is that defenders 
of boilerplate accountability waivers also risk expressing contempt at odds with 
dignity by defending them in paternalistic terms.233 Remarkably, James Gibson 
objects directly to Ben-Shahar’s argument, calling it an example of “private 
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paternalism,” while exclaiming, “[t]he world has gone topsy-turvy when those who 
favor enforcement of contracts paternalistically purport to know what is best for 
individuals without consulting them, whereas those who oppose enforcement are 
labeled ‘autonomists’ and make arguments based on individual agency.”234  
There is a grain of truth to Gibson’s argument, and the rest of this subsection will 
defend a version of it. But as the argument stands, it moves too quickly. To see why, 
notice that leading conceptions of paternalism hold that paternalism refers to a motive 
for behavior.235 But motive-based conceptions initially seem to undermine the claim 
that accountability waivers are paternalistic. After all, firms and their agents 
(arguably) aim to maximize profits and nothing else (except to the extent that 
something else indirectly serves that goal). As a result, it might seem unlikely that 
firms do anything for consumers or employees—let alone impose accountability 
waivers—because they are motivated to serve the interests of those consumers or 
employees. So if motive-based views are correct, then the idea that accountability 
waivers count as paternalistic seems like a nonstarter. 
This is not the place to evaluate the merits of motive-based conceptions of 
paternalism.236 But the objection grounded in motive-based conceptions is far from 
decisive. First, uncontroversial theories of paternalism remain elusive,237 and motive-
based paternalism is not the only game in town. And although canvasing all existing 
theories is not feasible here, suffice it to say that I reject the view that paternalistic 
motivations are necessary for paternalism, even though they may sometimes suffice. 
Views about paternalism exist that emphasize what rationales are publicly proffered 
in favor of behavior or policies.238 Other views focus on whether paternalistic 
judgments are expressed.239 The idea here is that, just like an actor can express sorrow 
without subjectively feeling sad, agents can express paternalistic judgments even if 
the relevant agents lack paternalistic motivations. To make this claim prima facie 
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plausible, notice that we recognize many laws and policies as paradigmatically 
paternalistic—including seatbelt laws and motorcycle helmet laws—even though we 
lack knowledge about whether the individual authors of the those policies were 
motivated by paternalistic judgments.240 This is, I submit, because it is possible for 
agents to express paternalistic judgments, through their behavior and arguments, 
without having any paternalistic mental states or motivations at all.  
Tradeoff arguments appear to do precisely this—at least when firms use tradeoff 
arguments to defend boilerplate accountability waivers. Indeed, it is very difficult to 
take tradeoff arguments seriously without presupposing a paternalistic premise. To 
see why, suppose that firms lacked superior judgment to consumers or employees 
about whether mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses better protected their 
interests. This would seriously compound any doubts we would have about tradeoff 
arguments and their empirical foundations. After all, if firms that imposed the 
waivers were in epistemically no better position than individuals subject to the 
waivers (to determine whether those waivers were good for them), individually or in 
aggregate, then we have strong reason to doubt the truth of the underlying tradeoff 
argument that asserts that individuals are better off. So to the extent that the practices 
of imposing and enforcing accountability waivers are actually defended in terms of 
tradeoff arguments—or normatively depend on them241—there is reason to believe 
that those practices count as paternalistic.242  
So tradeoff arguments, though initially appealing and intuitive, fail to respond to 
the problem of boilerplate indignity in two ways. First, they prove too much by 
suggesting that wholesale waivers of the right to sue should be permissible, and 
second, they appear to presuppose or express paternalism.  
3. Proving Too Much 
Another worry is that the indignity argument simply proves too much; that too 
many perfectly valid waivers will end up, in the present analysis, incompatible with 
dignity. To take a concrete example, consider a local business—a gym, perhaps—
that includes a fairly broad boilerplate liability waiver. There is a disparity of 
bargaining power here, the term is nonnegotiable, and it entails that for quite a lot of 
claims individuals will not be able to sue in court for perceived transgressions. Would 
this waiver be incompatible with one’s dignity? 
It depends. Dignity itself requires autonomy,243 though they are not identical.244 
Some valuable activities—medical procedures and other especially injury-prone yet 
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valuable activities—might very well become inaccessible if they were too vulnerable 
to litigation. Waivers should be narrowly tailored to make the activity in question 
feasible. Other things being equal, the broader a particular waiver is, the more likely 
it is that the waiver compromises an individual’s dignity. Yet even then certain 
activities may themselves be incompatible with dignity and thus should not be 
worthy of protection.245 Neither small businesses nor medical practices should 
jeopardize the dignity of their consumers and employees. “Business necessity” is not 
a cure-all. Firms that cannot operate without due regard for the dignity of the 
consumers and employees have no business being in business.  
III. APPLICATIONS: EX ANTE AND EX POST 
So boilerplate accountability waivers threaten our dignity interests. But 
recognizing this overlooked reason in favor of robustly regulating boilerplate—and 
boilerplate accountability waivers in particular—does not tell us the form that 
regulation will take. This Part nevertheless considers—in very broad strokes—two 
modes of intervention: ex ante regulation and ex post adjudication or investigation. 
Specifically, arbitration clauses are probably best constrained using ex ante 
regulations or statutory interventions, while other forms of potentially dignity-
degrading accountability waivers are probably better rooted out through ex post 
modes of adjudication or investigation. 
A. Ex Ante Regulation 
If boilerplate accountability waivers threaten the dignity of consumers or 
employees, this would provide a compelling new reason to robustly regulate 
boilerplate. Enacting some version of the Arbitration Fairness Act would curtail the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in many boilerplate contracts.246 But many other 
regulations of accountability waivers—whether codified in statutes or promulgated 
by administrative agencies—are possible. Regulations range from wholesale “bans” 
of all accountability waivers as a group, bans on particular waivers like arbitration 
clauses,247 partial prohibitions—like the one attempted by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, which prohibited arbitration clauses that precluded mass 
arbitration248—and so on. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand has introduced a bill that would 
prevent the enforcement of arbitration clauses that purport to require arbitration of 
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sexual harassment claims under Title VII.249 And there are a litany of regulatory 
techniques beyond outright bans.  
No model statute or rule aiming to mitigate disrespectful accountability waivers 
will be offered in this exploratory sketch. But two broad observations about ex ante 
intervention should nevertheless frame further thinking on the matter. First, among 
the various accountability waivers described earlier, arbitration clauses appear most 
amenable to ex ante regulation in consumer and employee contracts. Mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses, unlike other accountability waivers, transparently aim to 
prevent individuals from holding firms accountable in courts of law. 
But other accountability waivers—such as choice-of-forum clauses—appear to 
formally preserve rights to sue in court, at least in principle.250 In such cases, 
establishing that these clauses count as accountability waivers becomes more 
difficult since the aims of these clauses do not straightforwardly include attempts to 
deprive citizens of their day in court. This makes ex ante regulation that targets all 
accountability waivers as a class especially prone to sweeping too broadly by 
unnecessarily penalizing the use of clauses that do not actually harm individual 
dignity. So, ex ante regulations will less likely risk sweeping too broadly if they focus 
primarily on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
Does this mean that all mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be 
banned? One need not be an absolutist to think that the various problems with 
arbitration clauses justify wholesale bans on pre-dispute arbitration clauses found in 
boilerplate consumer and employee contracts. Although this initially might sound 
radical, there already exists a ban on these arbitration clauses in consumer financial 
contracts involving active military personnel and their families.251 And it is difficult 
to argue that they face wholly unique vulnerabilities to financial predation as 
compared to civilians.252 Nor can we plausibly argue that military personnel or their 
families are worthier of protection from boilerplate indignity.253 Finally, banning pre-
dispute arbitration clauses would not mean the end of arbitration, given the option of 
arbitration after a dispute arises. 
An alternative to the outright ban would be to attempt to perform some type of 
cost-benefit analysis before imposing any ex ante regulation,254 while affording 
special weight to the dignity interests jeopardized by disrespectful arbitration 
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clauses. Some versions of this approach attempt to monetize dignity interests, while 
others eschew such attempts.255 And difficulties remain in figuring out how to 
“balance” monetized costs against non-monetized values like dignity. But we need 
not resolve these controversies here. For present purposes, notice that the dominant 
form of reasoning used to justify regulatory intervention—cost-benefit analysis—
makes room for considering precisely the kind of dignity interests jeopardized by 
accountability waivers generally and arbitration clauses specifically. So dignity 
retains normative purchase in modern regulatory practice—and is still consistent 
with outright bans on certain kinds of arbitration clauses depending on how one 
conducts the cost-benefit analysis. 
B. Ex Post Adjudication or Investigation 
Accountability waivers besides arbitration clauses are more difficult to identify. 
As already discussed, some choice-of-forum clauses might not qualify as 
accountability waivers to the extent that firms do not use them with the goal of 
preventing litigants from accessing courts.256 Sometimes, determining whether 
individual boilerplate clauses count as accountability waivers requires case-specific 
evidence; ex post approaches appear to fit most naturally with attempts to mitigate 
accountability waivers including choice-of-forum clauses, exculpation clauses, and 
unilateral modification clauses. 
Two ex post approaches come to mind. First, individual litigants can seek to 
challenge these clauses under pre-existing doctrines like unconscionability. Plaintiffs 
seeking to avoid or challenge these clauses can use the discovery process to identify 
evidence as to whether they are being used to avoid litigation or genuinely serve 
some other legitimate purpose. The difficulty with this litigation-based approach, of 
course, is obvious: litigants will not likely reach court, let alone obtain discovery, if 
these clauses succeed as accountability waivers. After all, individuals may be 
effectively prevented from suing in court, so they will not be in a position to 
challenge the very clauses preventing them from doing so. 
The second ex post approach comes through the civil enforcement divisions of 
consumer protection agencies or offices of attorneys general. To the extent certain 
firms systematically avoid litigation simply because they have used accountability 
waivers, these firms look like natural targets for civil investigative demands. These 
demands may ripen into settlements for consumers or lawsuits under, say, state unfair 
trade practices acts. This is not the place to evaluate the merits of such claims. But 
this approach does show an alternative avenue for rooting out dignitary harms 
otherwise hiding in plain sight. 
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agencies may take into account dignity, including the indignity of “lowering” the “status of 
adults to the status of children,” see Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732, 1775 (2014).  
 256. See supra Section I.A.2. 
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CONCLUSION 
Consumers and employees—basically, everyone in the United States—frequently 
face boilerplate contracts that impose onerous terms that make it difficult—indeed, 
often practically impossible—to hold firms accountable in court. This is well known, 
as is the fact that these terms are very difficult to systematically avoid, provided that 
one wishes to participate in modern commercial society at all.  
This Article has argued that standard criticisms of boilerplate largely overlook 
how it threatens dignity. Focusing on terms imposed by firms that aim to keep 
individuals out of court, this Article has argued that these terms undermine individual 
dignity in at least two interrelated ways. The instrumental argument showed how 
firms harm individuals’ dignity interests by preventing them from using the power 
and prestige of courts to publicly vindicate their dignity, not just their legal rights. 
The second claim argued that attempting to deprive individuals of these rights, and 
succeeding, puts individuals in a degraded position, such that they no longer have 
the high-ranking status that constitutes dignity itself.  
Governments have compelling interests in protecting individuals against harms to 
dignity. My hope is that shining a light on how boilerplate manages to damage our 
dignity will motivate reform or at least provide a new reason to justify it. 
 
